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This paper provides new estimates of the effects of fiscal policies by using a non-linear
structural VAR model. This methodology is applied to Belgium, France, Germany and
Netherlands cases. Results show that reactions to a fiscal shock are different according to the
regime that prevails and across countries.
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One of the principal challenges facing ￿scal authorities in the current economic
context is that of the consistency of their policies. Governments must achieve two
goals: stabilisation of the activity and ￿scal sustainability. This implies that ￿scal
policies are using a stabilizing tool, but are also subject to a structural adjustment
constraint. This has an in￿ uence on the e⁄ects of these policies.
From an empirical point-of-view, the e⁄ects of ￿scal policies are usually estim-
ated using a structural VAR representation (S-VAR), in which decompose economic
￿ uctuations into di⁄erent sources of structural disturbances. The crucial step in
this methodology is the identi￿cation of ￿scal shock. The literature presents various
approaches: a ￿rst one consists in identifying ￿scal shocks by sign restrictions on the
impulse response (Mountford and Uhlig, 2002); a second approach, represented by
Favero (2002) uses a Choleski ordering; and a third approach, developed by Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2002), uses decision lags in ￿scal policy and
institutional information about the elasticity of ￿scal variables to economic activity.
The S-VAR representation assumes that the behaviour of the agents is constant in
time and that they are not a⁄ected by the economic environment. Recent studies
have, however, highlighted the fact that the interactions between ￿scal variables
and economic activity can possibly be neither symmetric nor homogenous in time.
These studies have pointed out in particular the existence of non-Keynesian e⁄ects
(Giavazzi et al., 2000). All these considerations can usually modify the conclusions.
Indeed, the role of time changes and breaks in the structural models were highlighted
by Sims and Zha (2002).
Thus, we consider that introducing non-linear elements into the S-VAR processes
can signi￿cantly enhance the study of the macroeconomic e⁄ects of ￿scal policy.
The nonlinear S-VAR representation was established by Ehrmann (2000) to study
European monetary policy and was generalised by Ehrmann et al (2003). Our
contribution comes from using this method to study ￿scal policymaking.
2 The econometric methodology
2.1 The database
Basic variables for studying the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy are the GDP in volume
and in logarithm (y) and the ratio of the primary balance to the GDP (b). We
then add two ￿nancial variables: in￿ ation (p) and interest rate (i). This addition is
made as a result of Sims￿ s criticism (1998), backed up by Perotti (2002). The data
used come from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts. The study covers the
period 1970-2004 and four European countries: Belgium, France, Germany and the
1Netherlands. Taking the results of the stationarity tests into account, the X-variable
vector includes the ￿rst di⁄erence of the series.
2.2 MS-VAR Estimation
So as to be in a nonlinear environment, the traditional VAR representation is
replaced by a regime switching VAR representation (MS-VAR). The basic model
estimated is therefore as follows:
Xt = ￿st +
k X
n=1
￿n;st￿n + "t (1)
where ￿st is an intercept, k is the lag number, "t represents the errors vector. The
variance-covariance matrix is noted ￿st. Parameters may switch between the s re-
gimes, which are limited to two: expansion (regime 1) and recession (regime 2).
It is assumed the regimes follow a Markov chain. The probability of staying in
regime j in the next period is conditional on the current regime i which is sup-
posed to be exogenous and constant. The conditional transition probabilities are
collected in a transition matrix P. The set of unknown parameters to be estim-





. The model is estimated through the Expectations-
Maximization algorithm (Hamilton, 1990).
2.3 Identifying restrictions
In the reduced form, the VAR errors are correlated. They cannot therefore be
directly interpreted as structural shocks. Going from the reduced to the structural
form which includes structural shocks ut, is done using a linear combination between
the shocks in accord with the following relationship:
"t = Zut (2)
The model can be expressed in tis moving-average representation:
Xt = C(L)"t = R(L)ut = C(L)Zut (3)
Identifying the VAR model requires imposing constraints on the Z-matrix ele-
ments. Since structural shocks are orthogonal (i.e. ￿ = ZZ0) and we have four
variables, we will have to choose six restrictions. We use the identi￿cation methodo-
logy proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1992). Blanchard and Quah
(1989) propose identifying the supply shock as the only shock having a permanent
e⁄ect on the level of GDP. This results in three long-term constraints: in￿ ation,
2monetary and ￿scal shocks do not a⁄ect the level of GDP in the long term. These
long term restrictions imply the nullity of the elements of long term matrix e⁄ects
of structural shocks, i.e. R(1). Gali￿ s method proposes short-term constraints which
re￿ ect a variable￿ s lack of instantaneous response to a structural shock and which
correspond to the nullity of certain coe¢ cients of the matrix Z. Thus, taking into ac-
count the transmission delay of economic policies, monetary and ￿scal shocks should
have no instantaneous e⁄ect on GDP. Furthermore, the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on in-
terest rates go through the indirect e⁄ects of aggregate demand and are therefore
shifted.
Identifying restrictions are transposed to the non-linear framework. It results
that the matrix Z contains at the same time known parameters and unknown para-
meters; and thus depends on the regime which prevails in the economy.
2.4 Reaction function analysis
Analysing the variables￿reaction to structural shocks is handled mainly by
studying the impulse response functions (IRF). They show the relationships between
each macroeconomic variable and each structural shock in each regime according to
a given horizon. It follows that the e⁄ects of discretionary ￿scal policy correspond
to the ￿scal shock response functions. The formalization of these functions, noted
￿ni;h, shows the expected change in variables at time t+h to one standard deviation




p st = ::: = st+h = i (4)
Estimation of these IRF uses the Ehrmann et al. (2003) methodology. Estimates
are derived by combining the parameters estimates of the MS-VAR with the estimate
of the matrix Z:






ji b Ziu0 (6)
3 Results
The results show a dual interaction between monetary and ￿scal policies. When
the economy is expanding, governments react to the monetary shock with a ￿scal
restriction. The response of the primary balance to a monetary shock is therefore
positive. Conversely, one ￿nds ￿coordination￿ between the monetary and ￿scal
3authorities when the economy is in recession. A monetary ￿turn of the screw￿
implies an expansionist response from the government to stimulate growth.
The main message of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) is that there
are two di⁄erent mechanisms that enable the ex ante satisfaction of the government
present-value budget constraint, i.e. this budget constraint is not viewed as an
identify but as an equilibrium condition.. In the ￿rst case, the government adjusts
its future expenditure and revenues so they respect the ￿scal constraint for any value
of the interest rate. In the second case, the FTPL case, the ￿scal authority does not
act in accordance with the ful￿lment of its budget constraint, so that is the ￿task￿
of the price level to ensure equilibrium. This theory stresses the ability of price
levels to evolve away from the current value of the ￿scal constraint. The result of
this is that an increase in the primary balance implies a decrease in prices (Creel
and Sterdyniak, 2002). Our study does not con￿rm this result.
The GDP￿ s reaction to ￿scal shock represents the e⁄ect of the discretionary ￿scal
policy. A negative reaction implies a Keynesian e⁄ect (K): de￿cit reduction harms
growth. Conversely, a positive reaction re￿ ects an anti-Keynesian e⁄ect (AK) where
de￿cit reduction allows stimulation of economic activity. If the ￿scal shock has no
signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of GDP, then this implies a non-Keynesian e⁄ect (NK)
for the ￿scal policy. Therefore, discretionary ￿scal policy can be understood both
by the sign and by the amplitude of the GDP response to a ￿scal shock (Fig. 1.).
The results of our study indicate that, except for France, the GDP reaction to
￿scal shocks is di⁄erent according to the regime and the country studied (Table 1).
￿ In Belgium and in Germany, ￿scal policies have non-Keynesian e⁄ects in ex-
pansion and anti-Keynesian in recession. A characteristic of these countries
is a continuous search for ￿scal probity. Germany has put in place consol-
idations in the medium term and has imposed restrictions on the ￿Lander￿ .
Belgium has carried out a large-scale ￿scal adjustment since 1981 (de￿cit at
15% of GDP, returned to balance in 2000). This adjustment was made possible
in particular by creating independent institutions to prepare a diagnostic of
public ￿nances and macroeconomic forecasts.
￿ Conversely, the Netherlands has an anti-Keynesian e⁄ect during expansion and
non-Keynesian during recession. The predominance of anti-Keynesian e⁄ects
comes from the large-scale ￿scal adjustment carried out: the Dutch budget
balance has gone from a de￿cit of 6.2% of GDP in 1982, to a 2.2% of GDP
surplus. This improvement comes from the fact that governments, whatever
their make-up may be, have tried to reduce their de￿cits. This reduction,
however, was not continuous, but subjected to the economic environment,
hence the presence of non-Keynesian e⁄ects in recessionary periods.
4￿ French policy appears to keep a Keynesian e⁄ect, irrespective of the current
regime. It has always wanted to play an expansive role on activity, while trying
to keep to European constraints.
Table 1. Asymmetrical e⁄ects of ￿scal policy
Belgium France Germany Netherlands
st = 1 NK K NK AK
st = 2 AK K AK NK
Note: Type of ￿scal e⁄ect: Keynesian (K), non-Keynesian (NK), anti-Keynesian (AK) according
to the prevalent regime.
Moreover, the amplitude of the GDP response to a ￿scal shock varies country-
by-country (Table 2). Most of them reach their maximum within the 6 quarters
following the shock. It should be noted that these timescales are shorter in the case
of an economy in recession.
Table 2. Maximum amplitude of GDP response to a ￿scal shock
Belgium France Germany Netherlands
st = 1 -0.098 (9) -0.140 (6) 0.091 (4) 0.612 (6)
st = 2 0.056 (6) -0.222 (1) -0.356 (11) -0.237 (2)
Note: The values shown are those of the response functions estimated by the model. The
numbers in brackets represent the number of the quarter in which the absolute value of the
response amplitude is greatest.
4 Conclusion
This paper o⁄ers a new estimate of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in four European
countries. The method used makes it possible to highlight, ￿rstly, the e⁄ects of
economic growth di⁄erentiated by the state and, secondly, the discrepancies within
the Euro zone. The results of the study show di⁄erent reactions from the economic
growth to a ￿scal shock according to the economic regime. In addition, responses
amplitudes of activity to a ￿scal shock varie according to countries￿ . The results
can be made more complete by using a larger sample of countries and by using the
economic regimes￿di⁄erent control modes.
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6Fig. 1. Impulse reaction functions of GDP to a ￿scal shock. Solid red lines:
baseline estimates, dashed lines: 95% con￿dence bands.
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